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In a wearable sensor-based deployment, sensors are placed over the patient to monitor their body health parameters. Continuous
physiological information monitored by wearable sensors helps doctors have a better diagnostic and a suitable treatment. When
doctors want to access the patient’s sensor data remotely via network, the patient will authenticate the identity of the doctor first,
and then they will negotiate a key for further communication. Many lightweight schemes have been proposed to enable a mutual
authentication and key establishment between the two parties with the help of a gateway node, but most of these schemes cannot
enable identity confidentiality. Besides, the shared key is also known by the gateway, which means the patient’s sensor data could be
leaked to the gateway. In PriAuth, identities are encrypted to guarantee confidentiality. Additionally, Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
(ECDH) key exchange protocol has been adopted to ensure the secrecy of the key, avoiding the gateway access to it. Besides, only
hash and XOR computations are adopted because of the computability and power constraints of the wearable sensors.The proposed
scheme has been validated by BAN logic and AVISPA, and the results show the scheme has been proven as secure.
1. Introduction
As sensors become widespread in their usage regarding
healthmonitoring scenarios, a significant amount of personal
sensitive data like blood pressure, pulse, or electrocardio-
gram readings will be monitored. These sensors could be
interconnected to compose a Wireless Body Area Network
(WBAN). With different sensors gathering patient’s data and
continually sending these data to doctors or to a remote
monitoring station for further analysis, it is necessary tomake
sure that these data are transferred confidentially. The usual
way is to encrypt them first before they are sent.The proposal
presented in this paper, named PriAuth, aims to help the
patient and the doctor build a shared key for encrypting
health parameters.
Because only appointed doctors are allowed to access the
patient’s data, the patient and the doctor have to authenticate
each other first. A workable way is to introduce a gateway to
help the patient authenticating the legitimacy of the doctor
and vice versa. After authentication, the two parties will build
a shared key for further communication.
When a doctor wants to read patient’s data, he sends
a request to the patient. The patient forwards this request
together with his own identification information to the
gateway. The gateway checks whether the patient and the
doctor are legitimate, and if any of them is not regarded as
such then the scheme is aborted. Only when they are all
legitimate, the gateway sends the authentication result to the
patient. Once the patient has become aware of the legitimacy
of the doctor, he sends the authentication result to the doctor
as well. Based on the authentication result, the patient and the
doctor can build a shared key, which is used for encrypting
confidential information sent between them.
There are many research results focusing on the authen-
tication and key agreement problems; while most of them
could ensure the safety of the data, this is not enough, as there
is also a need to protect privacy.
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In the authentication process, the patient and the doctor
have to send their identities and some other related infor-
mation to the gateway. It has to be ensured that the patient’s
identity should not be leaked. Of course, a patient is usually
unwilling to leak his identity information, because if the
patient’s identity is leaked, the health history and status of
the patient will be freely available for anyone in the system,
regardless of the patient wishes.
On the other hand, when a doctor sends his identity to
the gateway for authentication, we have to make sure that
the doctor’s identity is kept confidential, too (e.g., when an
adversary eavesdrops the identity of the doctor and finds out
the doctor’s major is dermatology according to the identity of
the doctor, there is a great chance that the patient has a skin
related problem). Therefore, it is also necessary to keep the
doctor’s identity confidential in order to protect the privacy of
the patient. In PriAuth, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
is adopted as the method used to protect the identities of the
data transmission participants, which is similar to [15–21].
After the gateway finishes the authentication process, the
gateway will send the authentication result to the patient and
the doctor. Based on the authentication result, the patient
and the doctor could build a shared key. In some traditional
schemes, the gateway could learn the key shared from the
authentication information it gets from the patient and the
doctor.Thismeans the patient’s personal health data could be
leaked to the gateway. It is necessary to prevent the gateway
learning this key. In PriAuth, Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
(ECDH) key exchange protocol is adopted to ensure the
shared key secrecy between the patient and doctor. Besides,
only hash and XOR operations are adopted, which is suitable
for the wearable sensors.
PriAuth has been validated by BAN logic and AVISPA.
BAN logic is one of the most prevalent methods that help
determine whether the exchanged information is trustwor-
thy, secure against eavesdropping. BAN logic is also adopted
to prove the security of the schemes by [22–24]. AVISPA
(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications) is a tool for the automated validation of Internet
security-sensitive protocols and applications, which has been
widely adopted by [24–26], and so forth.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is related
works; Section 3 is the preliminary knowledge. In Section 4,
we introduce PriAuth; Section 5 provides the BAN logic
validation. Section 6 includes AVISPA verification. Section 7
is the security analysis part. Section 8 provides a comparison
with other schemes. Section 9 is the validation part. Section 10
concludes with a summary of the contributions.
2. Related Works
In several papers of the researched literature, the authors use
different acronyms; user and sensor are the most commonly
used, which equals to doctor and sensor in our scheme.Thus,
from now on, we will use user and sensor instead of doctor
and patient. D.Wang and P.Wang provide overviews of some
of the schemes described in [27, 28]. Farash et al. use a single
shared key between all the users or sensors to encrypt the
identities [13]. All the sensors use the same key ℎ(𝑋GWN ‖ 1)
to encrypt the sensor identity, using XORmethodwhere SID𝑗
is the sensor identity and 𝑇2 is a timestamp.
ESID𝑗 = SID𝑗 ⊕ ℎ (ℎ (𝑋GWN ‖ 1) ‖ 𝑇2) , (1)
where ℎ(𝑋GWN ‖ 1) is a key that is shared by all the
sensors, so malicious or curious sensors could learn the
identity of sensor SID𝑗. As ESID𝑗, 𝑇2 are sent via a public
channel. Amalicious or curious sensor with identity SID𝑘 can
eavesdrop sensor SID𝑗 to get ESID𝑗, 𝑇2. In order to get the
sensor id SID𝑗, SID𝑘 could decrypt ESID𝑗 using the same keyℎ(𝑋GWN ‖ 1):
ESID𝑗 ⊕ ℎ (ℎ (𝑋GWN ‖ 1) ‖ 𝑇2)
= {SID𝑗 ⊕ ℎ (ℎ (𝑋GWN ‖ 1) ‖ 𝑇2)}
⊕ ℎ (ℎ (𝑋GWN ‖ 1) ‖ 𝑇2) = SID𝑗.
(2)
Lu et al. use a random identity TID𝑖 to protect identity
privacy [10]. But as the identity is a fixed value, a user could
be tracked by an adversary. Schemes [29–32] use a similar
method, but all these procedures are prone to suffer from
tractability attack.
In scheme proposed by Wu et al., every time the gateway
gives a newPIDnewMU for the user [4]. But in this case, there is
a potential loss of synchronization problem: if the adversary
blocks the PIDnewMU from being sent to the user, then the
two parties may lose their synchronization. Das et al. protect
the identity of the user by generating a new masked identity
every time in a similar way, but this scheme suffers from loss
of synchronization problem, too [33].
Jung et al. use the similar method with the scheme [13]
of Farash et al. [6]. The key to encrypt the identity of a single
user is the same for all the users. This scheme has the same
problem that has been discussed. What a user sends to the
gateway node is as follows: DID𝑖 = ℎ(ID𝑖 ‖ 𝑅1), 𝑘 = ℎ(DID𝑖 ‖
V∗ ‖ 𝑇1), 𝐴 𝑖 = 𝐸𝑘(DID𝑖 ‖ 𝑅1 ‖ 𝑇1), so other users could learn
DID𝑖 by decrypting 𝐴 𝑖 with the same key V∗. Besides, this
scheme has the same inner side attacker problem, a detailed
analysis is shown in Section 7.4.
Rabin cryptosystem with quadratic residue problem is
used to encrypt a message [11, 34]. Assume 𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞, where
𝑝 and 𝑞 are two large primes. If 𝑦 = 𝑥2 mod 𝑛 has a solution,
that is, there exists a square root for 𝑦, then 𝑦 is called
a quadratic residue mod𝑛. The set of all quadratic residue
numbers in [1, 𝑛−1] is denoted byQR𝑛.The quadratic residue
problem states that, for 𝑦 ∈ QR𝑛, it is hard to find 𝑥 without
the knowledge of 𝑝 and 𝑞 due to the difficulty of factoring 𝑛
[35]; this is a kind of public-key encryption method.
Chatterjee and Das provide a similar methodology of
protecting the identity of the user. They use the ECC based
public key methods [15]. Besides, they try to combine the
authentication scheme with an attributed based access con-
trol scheme. He et al. use a similar method, while they use
exponentiation operations instead [36].
We summarize some of them in Table 1. From the table, it
can be inferred that privacy is a problem that has not drawn
enough attention from the researchers. In some schemes,
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Table 1: Comparison of protection of privacy.
Schemes Sensor anonymity User anonymity Shared key privacy
Choi et al. [1] × × √
Shi and Gong [2] × × √
Chang and Le [3, Scheme 1] × × ×
Chang and Le [3, Scheme 2] × × √
Wu et al. [4] √ × √
Das et al. [5] √ × √
Jung et al. [6] √ × ×
Fan et al. [7] × × ×
Amin and Biswas [8] × × ×
Nam et al. [9] × × √
Lu et al. [10] √ √ ×
Zhao et al. [11] √ × ×
Hou et al. [12] × × ×
Farash et al. [13] × × ×
Turkanovic´ et al. [14] × × ×
PriAuth √ √ √
all the users share the same key to encrypt their identities,
this means the encrypted identity could be decrypted by a
malicious or curious user using the same key [5, 6, 10, 13].
Some of the schemes fail to enable the anonymity of the
user or sensor, such as [37–39]. We adopt the ECC based
method to enable the anonymity, which is similar to [15–
21] because “ECC requires smaller keys compared to non-
ECC cryptography (based on plain Galois fields) to provide
equivalent security” [40]. The gateway has a public key that
is known by every user; all the identities are encrypted by
an XOR method with a new key which is generated from
gateway’s public key before the identities are sent to the
gateway. Thus, only the gateway could learn the identities.
As for the shared key between user and sensor, in some
schemes, the gateway knows the shared key in schemes
[6–8, 11–14], while, in some others, the gateway does not
know the key, they use Diffie–Hellman (DH) anonymous key
agreement protocol to build the shared key [1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 30].
As we have discussed, the gateway is not allowed to know
the shared key in order to prevent a curious gateway from
eavesdropping the sensor data.
3. Preliminary
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public-key cryptog-
raphy approach based on the algebraic structure of elliptic
curves over finite fields. For current cryptographic purposes,
an elliptic curve is a plane curve over a finite field (rather than
the real numbers) which consists of the points satisfying the
following:
𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏. (3)
In order to use ECC, all parties must agree on all the
domain parameters of the elliptic curve {𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ}:
𝐹(𝑝): the finite field over 𝑝, where 𝑝 is a prime and
represents the size of the finite field
(𝑎, 𝑏): the parameters of elliptic curves𝑦2 = 𝑥3+𝑎𝑥+𝑏
over 𝐹(𝑝)
𝐺(𝑥𝑝, 𝑦𝑝): generator point, but 𝐺 ̸= 0
𝑛: the order of the base point 𝐺
ℎ: cofactor, an integer, ℎ = 𝐹(𝑝)/𝑛
Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) is an anonymous
key agreement protocol that allows two parties; each has
an elliptic curve based public, private key pair, to establish
a shared secret over an insecure channel. Suppose Alice
wants to establish a shared key with Bob, but the channel
available for them is not safe. Initially, the domain parameters
(𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ) must be agreed upon. Also, each party must
have a key pair suitable for elliptic curve cryptography,
consisting of a private key 𝑑 (a randomly selected integer in
the interval [1, 𝑛−1]) and a public key𝑄 (where𝑄 = 𝑑𝐺, that
is, the result of adding 𝐺 together 𝑑 times).
Alice’s private key and public key are (𝑑𝐴, 𝑄𝐴); Bob’s key
pair is (𝑑𝐵, 𝑄𝐵). Alice computes 𝑑𝐴𝑄𝐵 while Bob computes𝑑𝐵𝑄𝐴. So the shared key between them is 𝑑𝐴𝑄𝐵 = 𝑑𝐵𝑄𝐴,
because
𝑑𝐴𝑄𝐵 = 𝑑𝐴𝑑𝐵𝐺 = 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝐴𝐺 = 𝑑𝐵𝑄𝐴. (4)
4. Privacy Enhanced Scheme: PriAuth
The structure model of our scheme is depicted in Figure 1.
A gateway is introduced to help user and sensor authenticate
each other. We suppose this gateway is trustworthy.
4.1. Symbols Used in the PriAuth. Before the scheme begins,
GWN (gateway node) generates the parameters for ECC
encryption (𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ). After that, GWN generates its
public-key pair (𝑑𝑔, 𝑄𝑔); besides, GWNgenerates a secret key𝑋GWN. The symbols are summarized in Table 2.
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User GatewaySensor
Figure 1: The structure of the model.
Table 2: Symbols used in the PriAuth.
Symbols Meaning
GWN Gateway node
𝑈𝑖 The 𝑖th user
𝑆𝑗 The 𝑗th sensor node
ID𝑖 The 𝑖th user’s identity
SID𝑗 The 𝑗th sensor’s identity
‖ String connector, connect two strings together
⊕ XOR operation
𝑋GWN GWN’s secret value, master key
𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 Shared key between 𝑆𝑗 and GWN
(𝑑𝑔, 𝑄𝑔) The private key and public key of GWN
𝐺 The generator of ECC
SK, SK󸀠 Shared key between user 𝑈𝑖 and 𝑆𝑗
𝑇1, 𝑇2 Timestamp
ℎ Hash function
4.2. Registration Phase of the Sensor. The registration mes-
sages of the sensor in registration phase are sent via the
public channel. Sensor 𝑆𝑗 conducts the following steps for
registration:
(1) It creates a random number 𝑟𝑗 and gets the timestamp𝑇1.
(2) It covers its password with 𝑟𝑗,𝑀𝑁𝑗 = 𝑟𝑗 ⊕ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗
and generates a hash value𝑀𝑃𝑗 = ℎ(𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑟𝑗 ‖
SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑇1).
(3) It sends {SID𝑗,𝑀𝑃𝑗,𝑀𝑁𝑗, 𝑇1} to GWN via a public
channel.
After GWN receives 𝑆𝑗’s registration message{SID𝑗,𝑀𝑃𝑗,𝑀𝑁𝑗, 𝑇1}. GWN has to check the freshness of
themessage by𝑇1, if themessage is not fresh, GWNabandons
the message. Then GWN computes 𝑟󸀠𝑗 = 𝑀𝑁𝑗 ⊕ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 .
GWN checks if 𝑀𝑃𝑗 equals ℎ(𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑟󸀠𝑗 ‖ SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑇1).
If they are not equal, GWN abandons the message. GWN
continues the sensor registration phase in the following
steps. The registration phase is described in Table 3.
(1) GWN computes 𝑥𝑗 = ℎ(SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN), 𝑒𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗 ⊕ℎ(SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗).
(2) GWN gets the timestamp 𝑇2 and gets the hash value𝑓𝑗 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2).
(3) GWN sends {𝑒𝑗, 𝑓𝑗, 𝑇2, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ, 𝑄𝑔} to sensor𝑆𝑗.
After receiving the message, 𝑆𝑗 first checks the freshness
of𝑇2, then computes 𝑥𝑗 = 𝑒𝑗⊕ℎ(SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗), and checks
if 𝑓𝑗 = ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2); if they are equal, 𝑆𝑗 stores{𝑥𝑗, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ, 𝑄𝑔} in its memory.
4.3. Registration Phase of the User. User𝑈𝑖 chooses a random
number 𝑟𝑖 and computes𝑀𝑃𝑖 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID𝑖 ‖ PW𝑖). 𝑈𝑖 then
sends {ID𝑖,𝑀𝑃𝑖} to GWN via a secure channel.
After receiving the user registration message {ID𝑖,𝑀𝑃𝑖},
GWN computes 𝑑𝑖 = ℎ(ID𝑖 ‖ 𝑋GWN), 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ⊕𝑀𝑃𝑖. Finally,
GWN sends {𝑓𝑖, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ, 𝑄𝑔} to 𝑈𝑖.
After receiving {𝑓𝑖, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ, 𝑄𝑔}, 𝑈𝑖 inserts the pre-
viously selected random nonce 𝑟𝑖 into it, now what in the
smart card is {𝑀𝑃𝑖, 𝑓𝑖, 𝑟𝑖, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ, 𝑄𝑔}. The registration
phase is described in Table 4.
4.4. Login and Authentication Phase. If user 𝑈𝑖 wants to
access a sensor’s data,𝑈𝑖 has to login first.This login process is
completed by the smart card SC. A user inserts his smart card
SC into a card reader and inputs his identity ID󸀠𝑖 and password
PW󸀠𝑖 . SC computes a temporary version𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID󸀠𝑖 ‖
PW󸀠𝑖 ) using the inserted PW󸀠𝑖 , ID󸀠𝑖 and the stored value 𝑟𝑖.
Then SC compares𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖 with𝑀𝑃𝑖 in the smart card. If they
are equal, SC acknowledges the legitimacy of 𝑈𝑖.
After user 𝑈𝑖 passes through the verification, then SC
prepares for the authentication process. SC computes 𝑑𝑖 =𝑓𝑖 ⊕ 𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖 using 𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖 in login phase. SC chooses a random
number 𝑘1 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1] and gets the timestamp 𝑇1. SC then
computes the following data:
𝐴 = 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝐺
𝐾𝑢𝑔 = ℎ(𝑇1 ‖ 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑄𝑔)
𝑀1 = (ID𝑖, SID𝑗) ⊕ 𝐾𝑢𝑔
𝑀2 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝑀1 ‖ 𝑑𝑖 ‖ 𝑇1)
Then SC sends Message 1 = {𝐴,𝑀1,𝑀2, 𝑇1} to sensor 𝑆𝑗
via a public channel.
After receiving {𝐴,𝑀1,𝑀2, 𝑇1} from 𝑈𝑖, sensor 𝑆𝑗 first
checks the freshness of 𝑇1 and 𝑆𝑗 abandons the message if 𝑇1
is not fresh and otherwise goes to the next step. 𝑆𝑗 chooses a
random number 𝑘2 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1] and gets the timestamp 𝑇2. 𝑆𝑗
then computes the following data:
𝐵 = 𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐺
𝑀3 = ℎ(𝐵 ‖ 𝑀2 ‖ 𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2)
𝑆𝑗 sends Message 2 = {𝐴,𝑀1,𝑀2, 𝑇1, 𝐵,𝑀3, 𝑇2} to GWN
via a public channel.
After receiving the message {𝐴,𝑀1,𝑀2, 𝑇1, 𝐵,𝑀3, 𝑇2},
GWN first checks the freshness of 𝑇1 and 𝑇2, if 𝑇1 or 𝑇2
is not fresh, GWN abandons the message; otherwise GWN
completes the following steps:
(1) GWN computes𝐾󸀠𝑢𝑔 = ℎ(𝑇1 ‖ 𝑑𝑔 ⋅ 𝐴).
(2) GWN gets ID󸀠𝑖 and SID
󸀠
𝑗 by (ID󸀠𝑖 , SID󸀠𝑗) = 𝑀1 ⊕ 𝐾󸀠𝑢𝑔.
(3) GWN computes 𝑑󸀠𝑖 by 𝑑󸀠𝑖 = ℎ(ID󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝑋GWN).
(4) GWN computes 𝑥󸀠𝑗 by 𝑥󸀠𝑗 = ℎ(SID󸀠𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN).
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Table 3: Registration phase of the sensor.
Sensor Gateway
SID𝑗, 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 master key 𝑋GWNfor each sensor stores SID𝑗, 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗
random number 𝑟𝑗
gets timestamp 𝑇1
𝑀𝑁𝑗 = 𝑟𝑗 ⊕ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗
𝑀𝑃𝑗 = ℎ(𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑟𝑗 ‖ SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑇1)
{SID𝑗 ,𝑀𝑃𝑗 ,𝑀𝑁𝑗 ,𝑇1}󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀→ checks if 𝑇1 is fresh𝑟󸀠𝑗 = 𝑀𝑁𝑗 ⊕ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗
𝑀𝑃𝑗 =? ℎ (𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑟𝑗 ‖ SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑇1)
gets timestamp 𝑇2
𝑥𝑗 = ℎ (SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN)
𝑒𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗 ⊕ ℎ (SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗)
𝑓𝑗 = ℎ (𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2)
checks if: 𝑇2 is fresh𝑥𝑗 = 𝑒𝑗 ⊕ ℎ(SID𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 )
{𝑒𝑗 ,𝑓𝑗 ,𝑇2 ,𝑝,𝑎,𝑏,𝐺,𝑛,ℎ,𝑄𝑔}←󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀
𝑓𝑗 =? ℎ(𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN-𝑆𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2)
stores {𝑥𝑗, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ, 𝑄𝑔}
Table 4: Registration phase of the user.
User Gateway
ID𝑖,PW𝑖 master key 𝑋GWN
random number 𝑟𝑖
𝑀𝑃𝑖 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID𝑖 ‖ PW𝑖)
{ID𝑖 ,𝑀𝑃𝑖}󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝑑𝑖 = ℎ(ID𝑖 ‖ 𝑋GWN)𝑓𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ⊕𝑀𝑃𝑖
inserts into the smart card
{𝑀𝑃𝑖, 𝑓𝑖, 𝑟𝑖, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ, 𝑄𝑔}
{𝑓𝑖 ,𝑝,𝑎,𝑏,𝐺,𝑛,ℎ,𝑄𝑔}←󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀
(5) GWN uses 𝑑󸀠𝑖 , 𝐴,𝑀1 and 𝑇1 to check if𝑀2 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖𝑀1 ‖ 𝑑󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝑇1). If they are equal, the procedure goes to
next step; otherwise it terminates here.
(6) GWN uses 𝑥󸀠𝑗, 𝐵,𝑀2 and 𝑇2 to check if𝑀3 = ℎ(𝐵 ‖
𝑀2 ‖ 𝑥󸀠𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2). If they are equal, the procedure goes
to next step; otherwise it terminates here.
(7) GWN calculates the following messages:
𝑀4 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑀3 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝑇2)
𝑀5 = ℎ(𝐵 ‖ 𝑑𝑖 ‖ 𝑀2 ‖ 𝐴 ‖ 𝑇1)
(8) GWN sends Message 3 = {𝑀4,𝑀5} to sensor 𝑆𝑗.
After receiving the message {𝑀4,𝑀5}, sensor 𝑆𝑗 does the
following calculations:
(1) 𝑆𝑗 uses 𝐴 getting from user to checks if𝑀4 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑀3 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝑇2). If they are equal, the procedure
goes to next step; otherwise it terminates here.
(2) 𝑆𝑗 calculates the shared key SK between 𝑈𝑖 and 𝑆𝑗:
SK = ℎ(𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐴) = ℎ(𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐺).
(3) 𝑆𝑗 sends Message 4 = {𝐵,𝑀5} to user 𝑈𝑖
After 𝑈𝑖 receives the message {𝐵,𝑀5}, 𝑈𝑖 goes to the
following steps. The whole process is in Table 5.
(1) 𝑈𝑖 uses 𝐵 getting from 𝑆𝑗 to check if𝑀5 = ℎ(𝐵 ‖ 𝑑𝑖 ‖𝑀2 ‖ 𝐴 ‖ 𝑇1); if they are equal, the procedure goes to
next step; otherwise it terminates here.
(2) 𝑈𝑖 calculates the shared key SK󸀠 between 𝑈𝑖 and 𝑆𝑗:
SK󸀠 = ℎ(𝑘1 ⋅ 𝐵) = ℎ(𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐺).
4.5. Password Change Phase. If a user wants to change his
password, he has to be authenticated by the smart card first.
We state the password change process in Table 6, which is a
summary of the steps:
(1) A user 𝑈𝑖 inserts his smart card SC into a card reader
and inputs their identity and password: ID𝑖,PW𝑖.
(2) SC computes ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID𝑖 ‖ PW𝑖) using password ID𝑖,
PW𝑖, and the stored 𝑟𝑖.
(3) SC compares ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID𝑖 ‖ PW𝑖) with the stored
version of 𝑀𝑃𝑖 in the smart card; if they are equal,
SC acknowledges the legitimacy of user 𝑈𝑖.
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Table 5: Login and authentication phase.
User Sensor Gateway
ID𝑖,PW𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 SID𝑗, 𝑥𝑗 𝑑𝑔, 𝑄𝑔
User: inserts SC into terminal
User: input ID󸀠𝑖 and PW
󸀠
𝑖
SC:𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID󸀠𝑖 ‖ PW󸀠𝑖 )
SC: 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 ⊕𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖
SC: random 𝑘1, 𝐴 = 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝐺
SC: gets timestamp 𝑇1
SC: 𝐾𝑢𝑔 = ℎ(𝑇1 ‖ 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑄𝑔)
SC:𝑀1 = (ID𝑖, SID𝑗) ⊕ 𝐾𝑢𝑔
SC:𝑀2 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝑀1 ‖ 𝑑𝑖 ‖ 𝑇1) checks the freshness of 𝑇1
{𝐴,𝑀1 ,𝑀2 ,𝑇1}󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀→ random 𝑘2, 𝐵 = 𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐺gets timestamp 𝑇2
𝑀3 = ℎ (𝐵 ‖ 𝑀2 ‖ 𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2) checks the freshness of 𝑇1, 𝑇2
{𝐴,𝑀1 ,𝑀2 ,𝑇1 ,𝐵,𝑀3 ,𝑇2}󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝐾
󸀠
𝑢𝑔 = ℎ(𝑇1 ‖ 𝑑𝑔 ⋅ 𝐴)
(ID󸀠𝑖 , SID󸀠𝑗) = 𝑀1 ⊕ 𝐾󸀠𝑢𝑔
𝑑󸀠𝑖 = ℎ (ID󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝑋GWN)
𝑥󸀠𝑗 = ℎ (SID󸀠𝑗 ‖ 𝑋GWN)
checks if:𝑀2 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝑀1 ‖ 𝑑󸀠𝑖 ‖ 𝑇1)
checks if:𝑀3 = ℎ(𝐵 ‖ 𝑀2 ‖ 𝑥󸀠𝑗 ‖ 𝑇2)
𝑀4 = ℎ (𝐴 ‖ 𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑀3 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝑇2)
𝑀5 = ℎ (𝐵 ‖ 𝑑𝑖 ‖ 𝑀2 ‖ 𝐴 ‖ 𝑇1)
checks if:𝑀4 = ℎ(𝐴 ‖ 𝑥𝑗 ‖ 𝑀3 ‖ 𝐵 ‖ 𝑇2)
SK = ℎ (𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐴) = ℎ(𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐺)
{𝑀4 ,𝑀5}←󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀
Checks if:𝑀5 = ℎ(𝐵 ‖ 𝑑𝑖 ‖ 𝑀2 ‖ 𝐴 ‖ 𝑇1)
SK󸀠 = ℎ (𝑘1 ⋅ 𝐵) = ℎ (𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐺)
{𝐵,𝑀5}←󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀
Table 6: Password change phase of the user.
User
User: inserts SC into terminal
User: inserts ID𝑖 and PW𝑖
SC: check if 𝑀𝑃𝑖 =? ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID𝑖 ‖ PW𝑖)
SC: 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 ⊕𝑀𝑃𝑖
User: inputs a new password PW󸀠𝑖
SC:𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖 = ℎ(𝑟𝑖 ‖ ID𝑖 ‖ PW󸀠𝑖 )
SC: 𝑓󸀠𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ⊕𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖
SC: changes 𝑓𝑖 with 𝑓󸀠𝑖
(4) SC computes 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 ⊕𝑀𝑃𝑖 using the stored values 𝑓𝑖
and the user password𝑀𝑃𝑖.
(5) User 𝑈𝑖 inputs the new password PW󸀠𝑖 .
(6) SC uses this new PW󸀠𝑖 to update the stored version of𝑓𝑖 with 𝑓󸀠𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ⊕𝑀𝑃󸀠𝑖 .
5. Security Analysis Using BAN Logic
5.1. Some Basic Knowledge of BAN Logic. A security analysis
of PriAuth using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic (BAN logic)
[41] is conducted in this part. With the help of BAN logic,
Table 7: Symbols of BAN logic.
Symbol Meaning
𝑃 |≡ 𝑋 𝑃 believes𝑋
𝑃 ⊲ 𝑋 𝑃 sees/receives 𝑋
𝑃 |∼ 𝑋 𝑃 once said𝑋 (or 𝑃 sent𝑋)
𝑃 |⇒ 𝑋 𝑃 controls𝑋
#(𝑋) 𝑋 is fresh
𝑃 𝑘←→ 𝑄 𝑃 and 𝑄 communicate using shared key𝐾
𝑘󳨀→Q 𝐾 is the public key of 𝑄
{𝑋}𝑘 Message𝑋 is encrypted by 𝐾
{𝑋}𝑘−1 Message𝑋 is encrypted by private key 𝐾
we can determine whether the exchanged information is
trustworthy and secure against eavesdropping. First, some
symbols and primary postulates used in BAN logic are
described in Tables 7 and 8.
5.2.ThePremise and Proof Goals of PriAuth. 𝑈𝑖, 𝑆𝑗, andGWN
are used as the user, sensor, and the gateway. SupposeGWN is
trustworthy, if GWN believes that𝑈𝑖 has said message𝑋 and
GWN believes that𝑋 is fresh, GWNwould send𝑋 to 𝑆𝑗. If 𝑆𝑗
believes𝑋 is fresh and 𝑆𝑗 believes GWN once said𝑋, then 𝑆𝑗
believes 𝑈𝑖 said 𝑋. This could be translated into BAN logic
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Table 8: Some primary BAN logic postulates.
Rule BAN Logic form
⊲ rule 𝑃 |≡
𝑘󳨀→ 𝑃, 𝑃 ⊲ {𝑋}𝑘
𝑃 ⊲ 𝑋 ,
𝑃 |≡ 𝑃 𝑘←→ 𝑄,𝑃 ⊲ {𝑋}𝑘
𝑃 ⊲ 𝑋 ,
𝑃 |≡ 𝑘󳨀→ 𝑄,𝑃 ⊲ {𝑋}𝑘−1
𝑃 ⊲ 𝑋
|∼ introduction rule 𝑃 |≡
𝑘󳨀→ 𝑄, 𝑃 ⊲ {𝑋}𝑘−1
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ 𝑋 ,
𝑃 |≡ 𝑃 𝑘←→ 𝑄,𝑃 ⊲ {𝑋}𝑘
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ 𝑋
|∼ elimination rule 𝑃 |≡ #(𝑋), 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ 𝑋𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ 𝑋
#()-introduction 𝑃 creates 𝑋𝑃 |≡ # 𝑋
Jurisdiction or control rule 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 󳨓⇒ 𝑋, 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ 𝑋𝑃 |≡ 𝑋
𝑘←→ introduction rule 𝑃 |≡ # (𝑘), 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ 𝑋
𝑃 |≡ 𝑃 𝑘←→ 𝑄
Freshness rule 𝑃 |≡ #(𝑋)𝑃 |≡ #(𝑋, 𝑌)
Elimination of multipart messages rule 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ (𝑋, 𝑌)𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ 𝑋 ,
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ (𝑋, 𝑌)
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ 𝑋 ,
𝑃 |≡ (𝑋, 𝑌)
𝑃 |≡ 𝑋 ,
𝑃 ⊲ (𝑋, 𝑌)
𝑃 ⊲ 𝑋 ,
𝑃 |≡ #(𝑋, 𝑌)
𝑃 |≡ # (𝑋)
like (postulate A). According to the “|∼ elimination rule,”
(postulate A) could be simplified as (postulate B). It is the
same as the message that sensor 𝑆𝑗 sends to GWN. If GWN
believes 𝑆𝑗 once said another message 𝑋 (the same notion is
used for simplification), and GWN believes𝑋 is fresh, GWN
would send 𝑋 to 𝑈𝑖. If 𝑈𝑖 believes 𝑋 is fresh and 𝑈𝑖 believes
GWN once said 𝑋, then 𝑈𝑖 believes 𝑆𝑗 said 𝑋. In the same
way, we can get (postulate C).
GWN |≡ # (𝑋) ,GWN |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |∼ 𝑋, 𝑆𝑗 |≡ # (𝑋) , 𝑆𝑗 |≡ GWN |∼ 𝑋
𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |∼ 𝑋 (postulate A)
GWN |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑋, 𝑆𝑗 |≡ GWN |≡ 𝑋
𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |∼ 𝑋 (postulate B)
GWN |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑋,𝑈𝑖 |≡ GWN |≡ 𝑋
𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |∼ 𝑋 (postulate C)
The proof goals of PriAuth in BAN logic form are in the
way described below. These goals could ensure 𝑈𝑖 and 𝑆𝑗 to
agree on a shared key SK.
(1) 𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 SK←→ 𝑆𝑗
(2) 𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 SK←→ 𝑆𝑗.
(5)
5.3. Preparation for Proof. Before the proof begins, messages
have to be transformed into an idealized form, the messages
of PriAuth in idealized form in BAN logic are given in Table 9
(𝐾𝑢𝑔 = ℎ(𝑇1 ‖ 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑄𝑔)). At the same time, some assumptions
have to be made, so (postulate B) and (postulate C) are
included as assumptions A11 and A12. The assumptions are
listed in Table 10.
5.4. The Proof of PriAuth. The whole proof of the proposal
is in Appendix A. It has been divided into 3 parts related to
Message 2,Message 3, andMessage 4 separately.The two goals
of the scheme are proved at theMessage 3 andMessage 4.The
proof results show that PriAuth is secured under BAN logic.
6. AVISPA Verification
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Proto-
cols andApplications) is “a push-button tool for the automated
validation of Internet security-sensitive protocols and applica-
tions” [42]. Recently, many papers have used this method as
a way to authenticate their protocols, like [24–26]. HLPSL
(High Level Protocols Specification Language) is a role-based
language that is used to describe security protocols and
specifying their intended security properties, as well as a set
of tools to formally validate them. We write the protocol in
HLPSL and test the protocol. The code is in Appendix B. The
goal of PriAuth is to create a key that is shared by a user and
a sensor. The validation result of the protocol is in Table 11.
Considering all these testing activities, it could be concluded
that our protocol is safe. PriAuth can protect the privacy of
the user identity, sensor identity, and the key between the user
and sensor.
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Table 9: The idealization form of the message.
Message Flow Idealized form
1 𝑈𝑖 󳨀→ 𝑆𝑗 {𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 , {𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 , 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖 , 𝑇1}
2 𝑆𝑗 󳨀→ GWN {𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 , {𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 , 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖 , 𝑇1, 𝐵, {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝑇2}𝑥𝑗 , 𝑇2}
3 GWN 󳨀→ 𝑆𝑗 {{𝐴,𝑀3, 𝐵, 𝑇2}𝑥𝑗 , {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝐴, 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖}
4 𝑆𝑗 󳨀→ 𝑈𝑖 {𝐵, {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝐴, 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖}
Table 10: Some assumptions.
Number Assumptions
A1 GWN |≡ # (𝐴)
A2 GWN |≡ # (𝐵)
A3 𝑆𝑗 |≡ # (𝐴)
A4 𝑈𝑖 |≡ # (𝐵)
A5 𝑈𝑖 |≡ GWN 𝑑𝑖←→ 𝑈𝑖
A6 GWN |≡ GWN 𝑑𝑖←→ 𝑈𝑖
A7 𝑈𝑖 |≡ GWN
𝐾𝑢𝑔←󳨀→ 𝑈𝑖
A8 GWN |≡ GWN 𝐾𝑢𝑔←󳨀→ 𝑈𝑖
A9 𝑆𝑗 |≡ GWN
𝑥𝑗←→ 𝑆𝑗
A10 GWN |≡ GWN 𝑥𝑗←→ 𝑆𝑗
A11
GWN |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑋, 𝑆𝑗 |≡ GWN |≡ 𝑋
𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |∼ 𝑋
A12
GWN |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑋,𝑈𝑖 |≡ GWN |≡ 𝑋
𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |∼ 𝑋
A13 𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 󳨓⇒ 𝐴
A14 𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 󳨓⇒ 𝐵
7. Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we conduct a security comparison of the
schemes that has been depicted as Table 12. For the scheme
in [3], we only consider the second situation.
7.1. Traceability Protection. Traceability means the adversary
can track a user or a sensor according to their identities or
masked identities like in the scheme [5, 10, 29–32].Once some
fixed information about the identities is used in a scheme,
then this scheme could probably be tracked by an adversary.
One possible solution is to update theirmasked identity every
time like in the schemes shown in [4, 7]. But these kinds of
solutions are vulnerable to loss of synchronization attack.
7.2. Synchronization Loss Attack. In order to protect the
identity of the user, the gateway will generate a new identity
for themwhen it is requested [4]. But if an adversary prevents
this new identity from being received by the user, the user
could not update his old identity while the gateway has
updated its stored version of the user’s identity.When the user
logs in for the next time, this legitimate userwill not be treated
as a legal one anymore. A similar problemexists in the scheme
[7].
7.3. Malicious Sensor Attack. Like in scheme [13], the gateway
only checks the legitimacy of a sensor. If the sensor is a
legitimate one, the gateway will reply some key information
to the sensor, but the gateway does not check if the sensor
is the one that the user wants to talk to. So a legitimate but
malicious sensor could launch an attack.
When a user sends a request message {𝑀1,𝑀2,𝑀3, 𝑇1}
to a sensor, an inner side legitimate sensor can intercept this
message to generate its own {𝑀󸀠4,𝑀󸀠5,ESID󸀠𝑗, 𝑇󸀠2} and send
this message to the gateway, as the gateway only checks the
legitimacy of the sensor.Therefore, this inner side sensor will
definitely be treated as a legal sensor. The gateway will send
{𝑀󸀠6,𝑀󸀠7,𝑀󸀠8,𝑀󸀠9, 𝑇󸀠3} to the sensor. Afterwards, the sensor
will be able to send {𝑀󸀠6,𝑀󸀠8,𝑀󸀠10, 𝑇󸀠3, 𝑇󸀠4} to the user, and it
will be treated as a legal sensor by the user, but the user will
not check if this is the sensor he wants to talk to. In this way,
the sensor could send false data to the user.
7.4. Inside User Attack. In scheme [6], all the users share a key
V∗, so there is a potential risk.Themessage a gateway sends to
the user is 𝐷𝑖 = 𝐸𝑘(DID𝑖 ‖ SID𝑛 ‖ SK ‖ 𝑅1 ‖ 𝑇4), where 𝑘 =ℎ(DID𝑖 ‖ V∗ ‖ 𝑇4), in which DID𝑖 and 𝑇4 are public message,
and V∗ is shared by all the legitimate users. This means any
legitimate user could decrypt𝐷𝑖 to get the shared key SK.
7.5. User Impersonation Attack. In scheme [1], when a user
asks to access a sensor’s data, he could send his request𝑀1 ={ID𝑢, ID𝑆𝑛 , 𝑋, 𝑇𝑢, 𝛼, 𝜔} to the sensor.
𝑋󸀠 = 𝑟𝑢 × 𝑃,
𝑋 = 𝑟𝑢 × 𝐾𝑢,
𝜔 = ℎ (ID𝑢 ‖ ℎ (ID𝑆𝑛 ‖ ℎ (𝑋 ⊕ 𝑌)) ‖ 𝑇𝑢) ,
𝛼 = ℎ (ID𝑢 ‖ ID𝑆𝑛 ‖ 𝑋 ‖ 𝑋󸀠 ‖ 𝑇𝑢 ‖ 𝜔) .
(6)
ID𝑢, 𝐾𝑢, 𝑃, and ID𝑆𝑛 are sent publicly; 𝑟𝑢 is a random
number generated by the user, whereas 𝑇𝑢 is a timestamp.
Only ℎ(𝑋 ⊕ 𝑌) is regarded as secret information between the
user and the gateway. ℎ(𝑋 ⊕ 𝑌) is shared by all the users;
other legitimate users, say a legitimate user with ID󸀠𝑢, could
easily generate a request the same as𝑀1, and then ID󸀠𝑢 will
be treated as ID𝑢 by the gateway.
8. Comparison
8.1. Computational Performance. Thenormalway to compute
the execution time of the protocol is to calculate protocol’s
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Table 11: Simulation results.
CL-AtSe back-end OFMC
SUMMARY % OFMC
SAFE % Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
DETAILS SAFE
BOUNDED NUMBER OF SESSIONS DETAILS
TYPED MODEL BOUNDED NUMBER OF SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
PROTOCOL
/home/iotdev/avispa/avispa-1.1/testsuite/results/usg.if
/home/iotdev/avispa/avispa-1.1/testsuite/results/usg.if GOAL
GOAL as specified
As Specified BACKEND
OFMC
BACKEND COMMENTS
CL-AtSe STATISTICS
parseTime: 0.00 s
STATISTICS searchTime: 0.05 s
Analysed: 14 states visitedNodes: 24 nodes
Reachable: 4 states depth: 4 plies
Translation: 0.00 seconds
Computation: 0.00 seconds
Table 12: Security feature comparison.
Security feature [1] [3, Scheme 2] [7] [9] PriAuth
User anonymity × × √ √ √
Sensor anonymity × × × × √
Shared key privacy √ √ √ √ √
Traceability of user × × √ √ √
Traceability of sensor × × × × √
Loss of synchronization √ √ × √ √
Malicious sensor attack √ √ √ √ √
User impersonation attack × √ √ √ √
Sensor impersonation attack √ √ √ √ √
Replay attack √ √ × √ √
Inside user attack √ √ √ √ √
computational costs of different operations, and the opera-
tions’ execution time is measured by simulation [3–14]. The
execution time of XOR operation is very small compared to
an elliptic curve point multiplication or hash operation; we
neglect it when computing the time approximately [3]. We
use the famous MIRACL++ Library [43] (example code can
be found at [44]). The experiment is conducted in Visual
C++ 2017 on a 64-bit Windows 7 operating system, 3.5 GHz
processor, 8 GB memory. The hash function is the SHA-1;
the symmetric encryption/decryption function is AES with
a 128-bit long key of the MR PCFB1 form (using one string
to encrypt another string, the same hash function is called
to get the hashed form of the key string). The elliptic curve
encryption scheme is ECC-160. The results are shown in
Table 13. 𝑇mac is the time for HMAC with SHA-1 operation,
according to [9] 𝑇mac ≈ 𝑇𝐻. The final result is in Table 14.
8.2. Communication Performance. The sum of each variable
length in bytes which a sensor node and a gateway node
need while performing authentication process is calculated
for comparison of the communication cost. The identity or
password is 8-byte long [13]. The sizes of the general hash
function’s output and timestamp are 20 bytes and 4 bytes,
respectively [45]. The random point of ECC-160 is 20 bytes.
The result is shown in Table 15. The byte length of the AES
encryption result is treated as byte length of the original data
for approximation.
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Table 13: Computation time of different operations.
Operations Time Experiment times
𝑇𝐻: one way hash function 0.0394ms 1000000
TE/D: symmetric encryption/decryption 0.5728ms 100000
𝑇MUL: scalar multiplication in ECC-160 3.66ms 2733
9. Validation
LifeWear project intends to improve the quality of human life
by using wearable equipment and applications for everyday
use [46]. The main objective of LifeWear is the development
of modern physiological monitoring to inspect human health
parameters, like blood pressure, pulse, or the electrocar-
diogram of a patient in different environments. With real-
time data of these health parameters, medical staffs can take
actions instantly, which can greatly improve the quality of a
treatment.
Since medical parameters are sent from patients to med-
ical staffs, data security and patient’s privacy are a must. In
order to ensure the data confidentiality, all the data must be
encrypted before they are sent. The proposed scheme helps
the patients and medical staff building a shared key. This key
will be used to encrypt the health parameters of the patient. In
order to protect the privacy of the patient, all the identities are
encrypted before they are sent as well. Since wearable sensors
have only limited computability, we introduce a gateway to
provide the patients and medical staff the shared key to be
used in the system.
LifeWear project alsomakes use of a middleware solution
able to hide heterogeneity and interoperability problem.This
middleware is composed of four abstraction layers related to
the functionalities covered in each of them, namely, hardware
abstraction layer, low and high services, cross-layer services,
and service composition platform.
The hardware abstraction layer includes the IoT hardware
platform, the operating system, and the networking stack.
It offers an easy way to port the solution to other hard-
ware platforms. The low and high service layers define the
software components needed to abstract the underlying net-
work heterogeneity, thus providing an integrated, distributed
environment to simplify programming tasks by means of a
set of generic services, along with an access point to the
management functions of the sensor network services. The
upper layer is the service composition platform, designed to
build applications using services offered by the lower layers.
The cross-layer services are offered to both high and low level
services in order to provide inner service composition. The
proposal presented in this paper (PriAuth) has been deployed
as a service inside this layer. The security service can be used
by the upper layer (service composition) to compose newly
secured services, based on the services presented in the lower
layers.
The architecture has been deployed over a commercial
IoT node solution called SunSPOT platform, manufactured
by Oracle. Main characteristics of SunSPOT hardware plat-
form are as follows:
(a) Processor: ARM 920T CPU (400MHz, 32 bits)
(b) Memory: 1Mb RAM, 8Mb Flash memory
(c) Network: Chipcon 2420 radio with integrated
antenna (IEEE 802.15.4 at 2.4GHz)
(d) Data: USB interface, mini-USB connector
(e) Power supply: 3.6 V rechargeable 750mAh Li-Ion
battery
10. Conclusions
Privacy will be a big concern as more and more IoT
equipment is applied into the medical scenarios. In this
paper, we propose an authentication and key agreement
scheme tailored for Wireless Sensor Networks. We focus
on the privacy problems during the authentication process.
Our scheme not only ensures the security of the data but
also protects the identity privacy of the users and sensors.
The shared key between the user and sensor is built by
means of the Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman method, which
could ensure forward privacy. The proposed scheme has
been verified with BAN logic and AVISPA, which are the
two most commonly used tools to validate the security of
the communication scheme. Simulation results show that
our scheme is feasible and secure. Furthermore, experiment
results show that our scheme is comparable with the related
works in terms of computation cost and more efficient in
communication cost.
As part of our work in the LifeWear project, we focus
on privacy problems during the authentication and key
establishment processes. In future, we will paymore attention
to authentication scheme without the help of the gateway.
Appendix
A. The Proof of PriAuth Using BAN Logic
The proof starts at Message 2. From Message 2 onwards, we
can prove that GWN believes 𝑈𝑖 once said 𝐴 and GWN
believes 𝑆𝑗 once said 𝐵.
(1) According to Message 2, we get
GWN ⊲ {𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 ,
{𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 , 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖 , 𝑇1, 𝐵, {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝑇2}𝑥𝑗 , 𝑇2} .
(A.1)
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Table 15: Communication comparison.
Schemes M1 M2 M3 M4 Total bytes Compared∗
Choi et al. [1] 80 124 44 68 316 +64
Chang and Le [3, Scheme 2] 64 84 64 44 256 +4
Fan et al. [7] 128 68 60 100 356 +104
Nam et al. [9] 52 104 40 56 252 0
PriAuth 64 108 40 40 252 0
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑∗ means compared with our scheme; M1, M2, M3, and M4 mean Messages 1, 2, 3, and 4.
(2) According to (A.1) and “‘,’-elimination rule”
GWN ⊲ {𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 , SID𝑗, 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖 , (A.2)
GWN ⊲ {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝑇2}𝑥𝑗 . (A.3)
(3) According to (A.2), A6, and “|∼ introduction rule”
GWN |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |∼ {𝐴, {ID𝑖, SID𝑗}𝐾𝑢𝑔 , SID𝑗, 𝑇1} . (A.4)
(4) According to (A.3), A10, and “|∼ introduction rule”
GWN |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |∼ {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝑇2} . (A.5)
(5) According to (A.4) and “‘,’-elimination rule”
GWN |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |∼ 𝐴. (A.6)
(6) According to (A.5) and “‘,’-elimination rule”
GWN |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |∼ 𝐵. (A.7)
(7) According to A1, (A.6), and “|∼ elimination rule”
GWN |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝐴. (A.8)
(8) According to A2, (A.7), and “|∼ elimination rule”
GWN |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝐵. (A.9)
The following content is the analysis of Message 3. From
it, we can prove that 𝑆𝑗 believes GWN believes 𝐴. Based on
assumption A11, we can get that 𝑆𝑗 believes𝑈𝑖 believes𝐴; this
process is shown at (A.10)∼(A.17). Equations (A.18)∼(A.20)
prove the first goal of the scheme.
(9) Based on Message 3,
𝑆𝑗 ⊲ {{𝐴,𝑀3, 𝐵, 𝑇2}𝑥𝑗 , {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝐴, 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖} . (A.10)
(10) According to (A.10) and “‘,’-elimination rule”
𝑆𝑗 ⊲ {{𝐴,𝑀3, 𝐵, 𝑇2}𝑥𝑗} . (A.11)
(11) According to (A.11), A9, and “|∼ introduction rule”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ GWN |∼ {𝐴,𝑀3, 𝐵, 𝑇2} . (A.12)
(12) According to (A.12) and “‘,’-elimination rule”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ GWN |∼ 𝐴. (A.13)
(13) According to A3, (A.13), and “|∼ elimination rule”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ GWN |≡ 𝐴. (A.14)
(14) According to A11, (A.8), (A.14), we get
𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |∼ 𝐴. (A.15)
(15) According to A3, (A.15), and “|∼ elimination rule”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝐴. (A.16)
(16) According to A13, (A.16), and “jurisdiction or control
rule”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝐴. (A.17)
(17) As 𝑘2 is randomly created by 𝑆𝑗, according to “#()-
introduction”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ # (𝑘2) . (A.18)
(18) According to (A.18), A3, A5, and “#()-promotion
rule”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ # (SK) SK = ℎ (𝑘2 ⋅ 𝐴) . (A.19)
(19) According to (A.19), (A.17), and “ 𝑘←→ introduction
rule”
𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 SK←→ 𝑈𝑖. (A.20)
The following is the analysis of Message 4, where it is
proven that 𝑈𝑖 believes GWN and believes 𝐵, based on
assumption A12, so we can infer that𝑈𝑖 believes 𝑆𝑗 believes 𝐵;
this procedure is shown at (A.21)∼(A.28). Equations (A.29)∼
(A.31) prove the first goal of the scheme. Until now, the two
goals of the scheme have been proved at (A.20) and (A.31), so
it can be claimed that this protocol is feasible and safe.
(20) Based on Message 4,
𝑈𝑖 ⊲ {𝐵, {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝐴, 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖} . (A.21)
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role user (Ui, Sj, GW : agent,
Kdi: symmetric key,
Kug: symmetric key,
H: hash func,
P: text,
SND US,RCV US: channel (dy))
played by Ui
def=
local State : nat,
T1,K1,Na,Nb,SIDj,IDi,SK : text
const user sensor sk,sc user id:protocol id
init Statefl 0
transition
(1) State = 0 RCV US(start)=|>
State' fl 2 /\ T1' fl new()
/\ K1' fl new()
/\ Na' fl exp(P,K1')
/\ SND US(Na'
.xor((IDi.SIDj),Kug)
.H(Na'.xor((IDi.SIDj),Kug).Kdi.T1')
.T1')
/\ secret(IDi,sc user id,{Ui,GW})
/\ secret(IDi,sc sensor id,{Ui,GW})
(2) State = 2 /\ RCV US(Nb'
.H(Nb'.Kdi.H(Na.xor((IDi.SIDj),Kug).Kdi.T1).Na.T1))=|>
State' fl 4 /\ SK' flH(exp(Nb',K1))
/\ witness(Ui,Sj,user sensor sk,SK')
/\ request(Ui,Sj,user sensor sk,SK')
end role
Box 1
(21) According to (A.21) and “‘,’-elimination rule”
𝑈𝑖 ⊲ {{𝐵,𝑀2, 𝐴, 𝑇1}𝑑𝑖} . (A.22)
(22) According to (A.22), A7, and “|∼ introduction rule”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ GWN |∼ {𝐵,𝑀2, 𝐴, 𝑇1} . (A.23)
(23) According to (A.23) and “‘,’-elimination rule”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |∼ 𝐵. (A.24)
(24) According to A4, (A.23), and “|∼ elimination rule”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ GWN |≡ 𝐵. (A.25)
(25) According to A12, (A.9), and (A.25), we get
𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |∼ 𝐵. (A.26)
(26) According to A4, (A.26), and “|∼ elimination rule”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 |≡ 𝐵. (A.27)
(27) According to A14, (A.27), and “jurisdiction or control
rule”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝐵. (A.28)
(28) As 𝑘2 is randomly created by 𝑈𝑖, according to “#()-
introduction”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ # (𝑘1) . (A.29)
(29) According to (A.29), A4, A6, and “#()-promotion
rule”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ # (SK) SK = ℎ (𝑘1 ⋅ 𝐵) . (A.30)
(30) According to (A.30), (A.27), and “ 𝑘←→ introduction
rule”
𝑈𝑖 |≡ 𝑆𝑗 SK←→ 𝑈𝑖. (A.31)
B. The HLPSL Code for PriAuth
The ECC public-key pair of the gateway is (𝑑𝑔, 𝑄𝑔). At the
beginning of this protocol usage, every user generates a
random number 𝑘1 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1] and calculates 𝐴 = 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝐺,
so we could treat (𝑘1, 𝐴), as the ECC key pair of this user, and
we send𝐴 to the gateway. Now the two parties could calculate
a shared key 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑄𝑔 = 𝑑𝑔 ⋅ 𝐴. Thus, at the beginning of the
scheme, we declare 𝐾𝑢𝑔 = ℎ(𝑇1 ‖ 𝑘1 ⋅ 𝑄𝑔) to be a symmetric
key between the two.
For the role of the user, see Box 1. For the role of the
sensor, see Box 2. For the role of the gateway, see Box 3.
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role sensor (Ui, Sj, GW : agent,
Kxj: symmetric key,
H: hash func,
P: text,
SND US,RCV US,SND SG,RCV SG: channel(dy))
played by Sj
def=
local State : nat,
T1,T2,K2, Na,Nb,SK : text,
Y,X,Z : message
const user sensor sk:protocol id
init Statefl 1
transition
(1) State = 1 /\ RCV US(Na'.Y'.Z'.T1') =|>
State' fl 3 /\ T2' fl new()
/\ K2' fl new()
/\ Nb' fl exp(P,K2')
/\ SND SG( Na'
.Y'
.Z'
.T1'
.Nb'
.H(Nb'.Z'.Kxj.T2')
.T2' )
(2) State = 2 /\ RCV SG( H(Na.Kxj.H(Nb.Z.Kxj.T2).T2)
.X' ) =|>
State' fl 4 /\ SK' flH(exp(Na,K2))
/\ witness(Sj,Ui,user sensor sk,SK')
/\ request(Sj,Ui,user sensor sk,SK')
/\ SND US(Nb
.X')
end role
Box 2
role gateway (Ui, Sj, GW : agent,
Kdi, Kxj: symmetric key,
Kug : symmetric key,
H: hash func,
SND SG, RCV SG: channel(dy))
played by GW
def=
local State : nat,
T1,T2,Na,Nb,IDi,SIDj : text
const sk User gwn,sk sensor gwn,sc sensor id,sc user id:protocol id
init Statefl 5
transition
(1) State = 5 /\ RCV SG( Na'
.xor((IDi'.SIDj'),Kug)
.H(Na'.xor((IDi'.SIDj'),Kug).Kdi.T1')
.T1'
.Nb'
.H(Nb'.H(Na'.xor((IDi'.SIDj'),Kug).Kdi.T1').Kxj.T2')
.T2') =|>
State' fl 7 /\ SND SG(
H(Na'.Kxj.H(Nb'.H(Na'.xor((IDi'.SIDj'),Kug).Kdi.T1').Kxj.T2').T2')
.H(Nb'.Kdi.H(Na'.xor((IDi'.SIDj'),Kug).Kdi.T1').Na'.T1)
)
/\ secret(IDi',sc user id,{Ui,GW})
/\ secret(SIDj',sc sensor id,{Ui,GW})
end role
Box 3
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role session(Ui, Sj, GW : agent,
Kdi, Kxj, Kug: symmetric key,
H: hash func,
P: text
)
def=
local SSU,RSU,
SSG,RSG,
SUS,RUS,
SGS,RGS:channel(dy)
composition
user(Ui,Sj,GW,Kdi,Kug,H,P,SUS,RUS)
/\ sensor(Ui,Sj,GW,Kxj,H,P,SSG,RSG,SSU,RSU)
/\ gateway(Ui,Sj,GW,Kdi,Kxj,Kug,H,SGS,RGS)
end role
Box 4
role environment()
def=
const ui, sj, gw : agent,
kdi, kxj, kug, kig, kiig: symmetric key,
user sensor sk: protocol id,
h: hash func,
p: text
intruder knowledge={ui, sj, gw, kig, kiig, h, p}
composition
session(ui,sj,gw, kdi,kxj,kug,h,p)
/\ session(ui, i,gw, kdi,kig,kug,h,p)
/\ session( i,sj,gw, kig,kxj,kiig,h,p)
end role
Box 5
goal
% Confidentiality (G12)
secrecy of sc sensor id,sc user id
% Message authentication (G2)
authentication on user sensor sk
end goal
Box 6
For the role of the session, see Box 4. For the role of the
environment, see Box 5.
The role of the goal is divided into two parts. The
first part is the “secrecy of sc sensor id,sc user id”; this
means we want to keep the identity of the user and sensor
confidential between them and the gateway. The second part
“authentication on user sensor sk” means the authentica-
tion of the shared key between a user and a sensor (see
Box 6).
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